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ABSTRACT 
 
Using exogenous geographic variation in exposure to 1993 reforms that introduced seat 
quotas for women in local government in India, I find a sizable increase in the 
enrollment rate of male and female school-age children resulting from additional 
exposure to women leaders. Effects are particularly concentrated among poorer 
households and those with less- educated proximate role models, and were 
commensurate with reductions in idle time and household-enterprise employment. 
There is no evidence for the effects being facilitated by changes in school infrastructure, 
the labor market, or among broader social factors related to intrahousehold bargaining. 
Using textual data from the news media and information on women’s candidacy in 
parliamentary elections, I argue that evidence points to the primacy of the effect of 
women leaders on young women, and that effects among men are in response to 
changes in young women’s enrollment. These dynamic effects on men could potentially 
be explained either through a signaling model of human capital investment, or by 
demand for an eventual education differential among married couples. 
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Many countries enact policies to proactively rectify historical inequities. Mandated seat or 
candidate quotas in elected bodies are a common incarnation of such efforts, having been 
legislated in over 90 countries as of 2015.1 Given the popularity of such policies, it is important 
to thoroughly understand the many dimensions of effects that a changed leadership composition 
may have on the well-being of constituents. That is, does policy aimed at enhancing individuals’ 
equality of opportunity in the sociopolitical sphere can lead to changes in the economic realities 
for members of newly-empowered groups, and if so, how? Furthermore, depending on the causal 
channel by which leaders affect the experience of others, there may be additional relevance to 
quota policies in other spheres such as those implemented in the commercial sector in several 
European countries in recent years (Bertrand et al. 2014, The Economist 2014). In this paper I 
examine the introduction and implementation of a national policy in India reserving elected seats 
in local government for women, and the relationship between exposure to women leaders and 
educational enrollment of young constituents. 
Credibly estimating policy effects for such a situation poses a number of challenges. 
Beyond likely endogeneity in policy adoption, educational decisions in developing countries are 
made amidst a complex web of factors that may be slow to change, including long-held traditions 
and cultural beliefs. This means that the effect of exposure to leaders on constituents’ human 
capital investment may be difficult to detect in the short term depending on the mechanism by 
which leaders affect the experience of constituents. 
To estimate long-term effects on enrollment I exploit a feature of the Indian experience in 
seat quota implementation that provides exogenous variation in exposure to the quota regime 
across areas over a span of 15 years. I find a small, but statistically distinguishable effect on 
enrollment rates of both young women and young men, on the order of one to two percentage 
points (approximately 0.05 -0.10 standard deviations) per additional year of exposure to the 
policy. The net effect is, in fact, substantial: the average policy exposure was just over ten years 
as of the period of analysis.  
Information on household characteristics and composition is used to show that effects 
were strongest among more disadvantaged individuals based on either economic status or social 
group, or those who likely had low expected returns to education (as captured by families with 
                                                 
1 Author’s calculations based on data from The Quota Project (2015). 
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uneducated adult women). Enrollment increases came primarily from reductions in individuals 
with idle time or engaged in non-labor force household duties. There was also some shift out of 
labor force activities (particularly household-based employment), although the magnitude of 
reduction in labor force is smaller and less pervasive across groups than reductions in other 
activities. Despite a nontrivial share of children engaged in the labor force, particularly among 
poorer households, this does not appear to be the primary margin from which enrollment gains 
were seen.  
I examine several potential channels by which the relationship between quotas and 
education may be effected. Using detailed administrative data on school infrastructure, I show 
that there is no evidence of increases in either the extensive on intensive margins of schooling 
facilities related to higher levels of exposure to seat quotas. I also find no effects in the labor 
market or among other typical indicators of women’s empowerment. Finally, using three 
empirical illustrations, I show how women in government may communicate a changing social 
environment to which individuals’ respond in setting their expectations and aspirations for social 
and economic outcomes. I provide discussion of how increases in educational enrollment among 
men can be understood as being in response to changed educational attendance of young women, 
either through a signaling model of human capital investment or if there is a persistent demand 
for an education differential in later marriage matching. 
I. India’s 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act 
Quotas for women and other historically marginalized groups in elected bodies were first 
implemented at the local level in India by a national policy embodied in the 73rd and 74th 
Amendments to the Indian Constitution. These pieces of legislation, passed in 1993, gave 
national support to the formalization and implementation of an historical, decentralized 
governance structure known as the panchayat (or, more formally, Panchayati Raj Institutions).2 
                                                 
2 Prior to 1993, panchayats operated at the village level and consisted of a small number of individuals chosen by a 
village to oversee various local affairs. Panchayats were not standardized in their structures, organization, 
operations, or responsibilities, nor were they necessarily elected bodies. By the mid-20th century, the panchayat 
system was widely recognized to embody “concealed forms of social prejudice, oppression and exploitation that 
were firmly rooted in local power structures” (GOI 2008). In the latter half of the 20th century there was support for 
the revival of a reformed panchayat system and by 1989 there was strong support at the national level to give 
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The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act instituted a three-tiered system of local government at 
the village, sub-district (block), and district levels across rural areas of the country, while the 
74th Constitutional Amendment Act instituted a revised local governance structure in 
municipalities.3 The Amendments were intended to provide large-scale devolution and 
decentralization of powers to the local bodies, stipulated that members of the local governance 
bodies were to be elected at five-year intervals, and provided for one-third of all seats at each 
governance level to be filled by women and a proportionate seat share reserved for 
representatives from historically marginalized social groups (Scheduled Castes/Scheduled 
Tribes, or SC/ST). These quotas overlap, providing for one-third of the SC/ST seats to be held by 
SC/ST women. 
The 73rd Amendment stipulated that states had the responsibility to adjust or amend local 
elections to comply with the provisions of the Amendments, and all states amended existing laws 
or passed new laws to be compliant within one year. Compliant elections were eventually held in 
nearly all states, and there is considerable variation in the timing of these first elections across 
states. As first pointed out by Iyer et al. (2012), this timing is thus plausibly exogenous due to 
state authorities waiting for the term of existing governing bodies to expire. That is, most state 
governments waited for the term of office of incumbent local officials to expire before 
conducting fresh elections in compliance with the provisions of the reform. Mathew (1995) 
provides a history of local elections by state, confirming (where available) that most states held 
their elections in the year predicted by pre-policy elections and terms of office.4 Although 
                                                                                                                                                             
constitutional status to a broad panchayat system, leading to the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts 
being enacted in 1993. 
3 The governance structures provided for in the 73rd Amendment have come to be known as the “Panchayati Raj”. 
This terminology specifically refers to rural governance, as urban bodies have a different name, function differently, 
and the implementation timing of the 74th Amendment was different from the 73rd Amendment. Responsibilities of 
the Panchayat include administration of state transfer programs, planning and implementation of schemes for 
economic development, establishment and administration of local public goods such as educational and medical 
facilities, oversight of local infrastructure (water, sewage, roads, etc.) and the monitoring of civil servants (Duflo 
2005). 
4 In other cases, implementation timing varied less exogenously. Several states chose to incorporate provisions 
regarding political reservations for women prior to when the constitutional amendment was to come into effect. 
Andhra Pradesh provided for 22 to 25 per cent reservations for women in the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayats Act, 
1964 (GOI 2008), while Karnataka introduced a similar level of reservation for women in 1985. Both Kerala and 
West Bengal restructured their institutions of local government in anticipation of the passing of the 73rd Act (in 
1991 and 1992, respectively) although elections implementing these reservations were not held until after 
enforcement in 1993. Bihar was prevented from implementation due to legal issues regarding certain provisions of 
the Amendments (Iyer et al. 2012). States comprised of primarily tribal populations (Meghalaya, Mizoram and 
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comprehensive data do not exist for all states, available evidence also confirms there was only 
minimal involvement of women in local elected bodies prior to this reform (Mathew 2000).  
Figure 1 depicts the variation in state-level differences in cumulative exposure to the 
policy as of 2007, where darkly-shaded states correspond to those states with longer (earlier) 
cumulative exposure to (implementation of) reservations. Madhya Pradesh, in the center of the 
country, is reflected as having longer exposure due to its early implementation whereas 
neighboring Chhattisgarh was one of the last states to implement the provisions of the 73rd 
Amendment in 2005. Once the provisions of the reform were implemented, one-third of seats 
were reserved for women at any level of the governance hierarchy; for single-seat leadership 
positions, reservations were assigned randomly across areas (whether at the village or district 
level) and election cycles. This feature of rotating leadership assignment has been used to assess 
the effects of women leaders in a number of previous studies (Beaman et al. 2012 and Iyer et al. 
2012, among others).  
It is well-established that decisions of a governance body can be influenced by changing 
their demographic composition. Using state-level variation in India over four decades, Pande 
(2003) identifies how the mandated reservations of legislative positions for minority groups 
increased the redistribution of resources towards these groups, demonstrating enhanced policy 
influence. Besley et al. (2004) found that reservation of a leadership position for SC/ST 
individuals increased access among SC/ST households to infrastructure and government 
services. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) use information on the location of public goods to 
show that when an area has leadership positions reserved for SC/ST individuals, the share of 
public goods going to that group is significantly higher, while Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b) 
use village-level variation in political reservations for women to predict the type of public goods 
provided in 265 reserved and unreserved villages in West Bengal and Rajasthan, finding that 
leaders invest more in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the needs of their own gender. 
Overall, the group identity of leaders has shown to matter in the type of public goods provided 
under the purview of the governing body, and this has been established in various contexts not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nagaland) were explicitly excluded from the purview of the Amendments (GOI 2008). Jammu - Kashmir introduced 
reservations at a level consistent with the Amendments via state-level legislation in 1997, although the election of 
panchayats implementing the reservations provided for under its own Act has not yet taken place (GOI 2008). 
Jharkhand has similarly never held reserved elections. Iyer et al. (2012) and Duflo (2011) provide further details on 
the implementation, structure and other aspects of the Panchayati Raj. 
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limited to the Indian case (e.g., Powley 2007, Washington 2008). Duflo (2005) provides an 
assessment of the case for political reservations for women and other historically-
underrepresented groups, and, using evidence from India, concludes that reservations incur a 
significant reallocation of public goods toward the preferred allocation of the previously 
politically-underrepresented groups. Pande and Ford (2011) provide a recent comprehensive 
review of the literature on gender quotas. 
 Additionally, the character and actions of governance bodies may influence those groups 
with which they interact. Topalova and Duflo (2004) find that women leaders in India are less 
likely to take bribes than their male counterparts, while Iyer et al. (2012) find evidence that 
political empowerment resulted in greater reporting of crimes against women. Leaders from 
newly-empowered groups may also change the perceptions of their group, potentially affecting 
an array of social and economic outcomes. Beaman et al. (2009) show how perceptions of 
women improve once men are exposed to women in leadership roles, providing substantial 
evidence in support of the model of attitudes and bias implicit in Hoff and Stiglitz (2010).5 Ghani 
et al. (2014) quantify the link between the timing of reservations and changes in women engaged 
in India’s manufacturing sector, find strong evidence of an increase in small-scale female 
entrepreneurship.  
The current work is also related to studies of the salience of returns to education. Jensen 
(2010a) shows how the provision of information on returns to education in the Dominican 
Republic affects enrollment, while Jensen (2010b) finds that knowledge (salience) of educational 
returns increases educational investment among girls. Linking these literatures, Nguyen (2008) 
finds that role model identity matters in the effect of information on updating perceived returns 
to education: role models of similar backgrounds to students have a larger impact on outcomes 
than role models of dissimilar backgrounds.   
Earlier work on the specific relationship between political empowerment and education 
uses cross-sectional variation to assess longer-term impacts of politicians on educational 
outcomes. Clots-Figueras (2012) uses a regression discontinuity design based on closely-won 
elections between female and male candidates to show that the gender of politicians affects the 
                                                 
5 Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) develop a conceptual framework to show how changes in power, technology and contacts 
with the outside world matter, especially because they can lead to changes in ideology. 
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educational levels of individuals who grow up in the districts where the politicians are elected. 
The author finds that the election of women politicians did increase primary school completion 
and that this effect was primarily found in urban and not rural areas, but that the effect was not 
statistically different for men versus women. Among a sample of households in 495 villages in 
West Bengal, Beaman et al (2012) examine the effects of randomly-rotated exposure to women 
in village-level leadership positions to identify effects on aspirations and educational outcomes 
for girls, with differences in exposure across districts of up to 15 years (three election cycles).6 
Compared to villages that never had chairperson seats reserved for women, the gender gap in 
aspirations closed by 25% in parents and 32% in adolescents in villages assigned to a female 
leader for two election cycles (approximately ten years). The gender gap in adolescent 
educational attainment is erased in these villages, and girls spend less time on household chores. 
The authors find no evidence of changes in young women’s labor market opportunities, using 
novel survey questions to attribute the impact of women leaders to a “role model” effect. Albeit 
for a different time period and scope, in this paper I follow the conceptual approach of exploiting 
exogenous cross-sectional geographic variation in exposure to leaders to identify longer-term, 
cumulative effects of women leaders on educational enrollment.  
II. Data: Reservations Implementation and School Enrollment 
Data on the timing of exposure to seat quotas comes from several publications documenting the 
implementation and progress of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment (Mathew 1995, 2000; GOI 
2008, Iyer et al. 2012). India’s National Sample Survey Organisation “Socio-Economic 
Survey—Schedule 10: Employment and Unemployment” provides data on enrollment (Hereafter 
referred to as “NSS data”). The NSS data come from a survey of a representative sample of 
households across all Indian states and union territories approximately every five years, with the 
household sampling frame drawn from the most recent population census and stratified within 
the rural and urban areas in each district. The analyses use data from survey rounds from 1983-84 
                                                 
6 There are more than 40,000 villages in West Bengal, which itself is one of the 35 states and union territories of 
India. 
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to 2007-08, over which period there were six survey rounds (additionally in 1987-88, 1993-94, 
1999-2000, and 2004-5). For simplicity, I refer to survey years only by the initial year. 7  
India’s Employment/Unemployment schedule is akin to many household labor force 
surveys administered worldwide. Respondent households provide individual-level details on 
demographics, employment, income and consumption particulars for all household members. 
The analysis exploits variation in the “usual principal activity” field, which among other 
activities indicates whether the individual was currently “attending [an] educational institution”. 
Beyond restricting to the sample of school-age children in rural areas of the country, minimal 
data cleaning procedures were required aside from geographic definitions being made consistent 
over time to account for changes in administrative boundaries and the bifurcation of three states 
in 2001. 
Table 1 shows trends in enrollment rates for various gender, age and social groups over 
the period of study based on the NSS data. Since 1987 there has been close to 100 percent 
enrollment in lower-primary school cohorts, motivating the restriction to individuals aged nine to 
17 for whom enrollment may have been affected by the policy change. Among the non-SC/ST 
population there has been substantial progress in enrollment rates in all age cohorts between 
1987 and 2007, with the 9-11 and 12-14 age brackets for young men improving from 91 and 78 
percent to 98 and 93 percent enrollment, respectively. In all age groups, women lag in initial and 
ending levels, although increases in enrollment rates were greater. In panel C, I calculate the 
educational enrollment gap. In the youngest school-age cohort there is almost no gender gap in 
any of the years, while among older age cohorts the gender gap has decreased substantially from 
14 percentage points in 1987 to almost zero by 2007 in the 9-11 age group, and from 28 percent 
to 10 percent in the 12-14 age group over the same period. The SC/ST group, having started at 
lower enrollment levels and with a wider gender gap, saw faster increases in enrollment rates and 
reduction in the gender gap, although by 2007 still not reaching full parity with same-age peers.8 
                                                 
7 After 2006-7 several states chose to increase seat quotas for women to a minimum of 50 percent. I thus restrict my 
analysis to the 2007-08 wave due to incomparability of the policy measure and its exogeneity across states. 
8 Azam and Kingdon (2012) characterize for a recent period the extent and patterns of sex bias in education in India. 
Notably, they find that pro-male gender bias exists in the primary school age group and increases with age. The 
authors also find that the extent of pro-male gender bias in educational expenditure is substantially greater in rural 
than in urban areas. 
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In order to use state-level implementation as exogenous identifying variation, I first look 
for evidence of whether the implementation timing across states was related to pre-period 
enrollment rate levels or trends. Figure 2 shows separately the initial state-level enrollment rates 
for the four sample groups by gender and social group in 1987 plotted against the order in which 
states implemented the reservations, supporting that claim that the reform implementation was 
exogenous to pre-period enrollment rate levels. The line in each panel is virtually flat, indicating 
no detectable relationship between pre-implementation enrollment rates and the subsequent 
timing of implementation across states. Table 2 provides empirical support for parallel time 
trends in enrollment rates in the ten years preceding the policy implementation by directly 
estimating the enrollment status of individuals using data from the earliest available survey year 
(1983-84) through the year of the reform passage (1993-94) with a linear trend term and an 
interaction of this trend with the state-level year of implementation. State fixed effects absorb the 
main effect of differential adoption years by state, and state-clustered standard errors correct for 
serial correlation within states. A negative coefficient on the interaction term would indicate if 
states that implemented the policy earlier also had more quickly-rising enrollment rates prior to 
the policy change. I find no evidence of this for any of the subgroups that are the focus of the 
analysis, providing substantial evidence of the parallel trends assumption necessary for 
identification from such staggered policy implementation.  
 
III. Event Study Estimates 
The analysis begins with an event study approach, which exploits variation in state-level policy 
exposure in a manner similar to difference-in-differences but without being limited to 
identification of short-term effects. That is, the event study approach allows for an unrestricted 
examination of the differences in enrollment rates in the years before and after the policy change, 
allowing one to capture effects of the policy that may be missed by standard difference-in-
differences when longer-term dynamics may exist (Wolfers 2006). The event-study approach is 
typically represented by the following equation, where k indexes years relative to the policy 
exposure: 
10 
 
 
𝐼[𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = "𝑌"] = ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝐼[𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑘]
∀ 𝑘
+ 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 (1)  
In this equation, s indexes states, t indexes year,  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠,𝑡 is defined as the 
number of years individual i  in state s and year t is relative to policy implementation in state s. 
The specification is typical of a standard difference-in-differences approach, with the 
modification that the term indicating active treatment is expanded into a vector of indicators in 
𝛽𝑘 for different years relative to the policy implementation. The application of the approach to 
this context is atypical in that I am able to observe enrollment only at intervals of four to six 
years, rather than annually, requiring the definition of k to encompass a range of years 
corresponding to the (average) interval frequency of observation. Standard errors are clustered 
by state and year corresponding to the definition of the vector of policy variables. 
The year range around when the policy was implemented in a given state is normalized to 
zero as the omitted group, and an indicator function creates the leads and lags (for different 
intervals) conditional on the year and state in which the respondent’s status is observed. To limit 
concerns over an unbalanced state panel, states not observed in all five of the intervals are 
removed from the sample (although this does not affect the results substantively). If the state and 
year fixed effects effectively control for differences across states, then the coefficient should 
fluctuate around zero for the interval prior to implementation.  
Using six rounds of survey data from 1983 to 2007, Figure 3 presents the coefficient 
vector 𝛽 separately by sex for the sample of nine to 17 year-olds. Confirming some priors, there 
is a clear pattern of enrollment increases among young women, approximately on the order of 
one percentage point increase in enrollment per additional year of exposure. Although 
insignificant, there is an upward trend among young men in the latter year range of either to 11 
years of exposure, suggesting that female leaders may potentially (directly or indirectly) affect 
enrollment of male enrollees in the longer term. The analysis in the following section will further 
examine the effect among men in order to determine if the late upward trend seen in the right 
panel of Figure 3 is statistically distinguishable from zero. 
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There are some of limitations to the event study approach. First, states naturally have 
different unobserved phenomena occurring over the period, despite parallel pre-policy trends, so 
there may be effects on both bias and precision in the degree to which additional unobservables 
may be removed. Particular to this context, the approach does not allow for the isolation of 
effects of women leaders for the minority group, who are subject to an additional quotas regime. 
In the next section, I outline an empirical approach that allows this (parametric) separation of 
additional confounders and quota regimes using the same exogenous variation in exposure. 
IV. Identifying Effects Using Border Discontinuities 
I now briefly motivate an approach aimed at addressing several of the limitations of the event 
study discussed above. This approach will take advantage of discontinuities in the level of 
exposure across neighboring districts lying across state borders in order to estimate more precise 
causal effects of the policy on enrollment rates. Consider a set of administrative districts 
(indexed by j) within larger geographic areas (indexed by k, not necessarily states). An equation 
relating policy exposure to enrollment rates in the cross-section of districts can be expressed as 
the following: 
 𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑘 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 + 𝜇𝑘 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑘 (2)  
Where 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 captures the cumulative years of exposure to the policy, which varies 
across districts j. The area-specific error term 𝜇𝑘 contains unobservables related to factors which 
are common to the area, while the district-specific disturbance term 𝜀𝑗,𝑘 captures factors 
determining enrollments which may be distinct across municipalities within the area but is 
exogenous to the policy exposure. 
The identifying assumption is that 𝜀𝑗,𝑘 and 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘 are uncorrelated; it may 
still be the case that area-level factors such as tradition, culture, or social norms influence 
unobservables related to the policy across areas. If the variation in 𝜇𝑘 is comprised of 
unobserved determinants that do not particularly correspond to administrative boundaries, 
another method of purging 𝜇𝑘 becomes necessary. One solution is to find areas with common 
unobservables but with differing levels of policy exposure such that a vector of fixed effects 
12 
 
corresponding to 𝜇𝑘 would purge area-specific unobservables.
9 In the current context, adjacent 
districts lying on either side of a state border fulfill such criteria. The empirical strategy will thus 
exploit cross-state differences in exposure to the policy to identify causal effects using cross-
sectional variation across border districts, having purged the equation of area-specific 
unobservables. 
Districts typically have multiple cross-border neighbors, requiring some discussion of 
process undertaken for assigning districts to pairs. The primary estimates come from a sample of 
cross-border pairs constructed to ensure that each district appears in the sample only once, as part 
of one pair. When constructing a pair for a given district from among multiple neighbors, the 
assignment to a pair is made based on commonality on a set of observables from 1991 
Population Census data (the rural population share, the SC/ST population share, and the rural 
female literacy rate). The two districts forming the “matched pair” are then included in the 
sample and removed from the pool of possible matches for other districts. Each unique pair is 
thus comprised of the two most similar districts among possible adjacency combinations. The 
empirical advantage of this process is that a given district can appear only once in the estimation 
sample as part of a unique pair, such that there is no mechanically-induced error term correlation 
that would result from including the same district multiple times.10 Disadvantages to this 
approach are that, as with any matching procedure, the choice of matching variables may be seen 
as ad hoc, and some border districts with only a single neighbor may never enter the sample, as 
can be visualized in Appendix Figure 1. In practice, whether non-duplicative pair sets are 
constructed based on matching observables, or are randomly chosen among multiple neighbors 
(more discussion below) does not make a substantive difference in the pattern or magnitudes of 
the estimated policy effects, or conclusions therefrom.  
Sample weights are used to calculate sex-specific district-level enrollment rates 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑘, and Table 3 provides summary statistics across districts for the matched 
sample. Appendix Table 1 provides evidence that border districts are similar to interior districts 
                                                 
9 Similar identification strategies have been implemented in many contexts, recently by Michalopoulos and 
Papaioannou (2014), Ghani et al. (2014), Jofre-Monseny (2012), Duranton et al. (2011), Naidu (2011), Dube et al. 
(2010), and earlier by Holmes (1998). 
10 A situation in which districts would appear multiple times would parallel matching “with replacement,” where 
bootstrap adjustments for standard errors in the general context have been shown to be invalid for matching 
estimators by Abadie and Imbens (2008).  
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in demographics and enrollment rates both prior to the policy change in 1987 and as of 2007.11 
The identifying assumption when estimating equation (2) is given by: 
 
 𝐸[𝜀𝑗,𝑘|𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘] = 0. (3)  
 
Violations of this assumption are likely to come in the form of either persistent 
unobservables in 𝜀𝑗,𝑘 that are not purged by area fixed effects 𝜇𝑘, or concurrent phenomena 
affecting enrollment confounded with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑘. Three steps are taken to address 
these concerns, leading to the specification variants shown in the tables. First, I estimate equation 
(2). I then include the 1987 district enrollment rate for the district to capture persistent 
differences across districts not removed by 𝜇𝑘. An additional specification estimates men’s and 
women’s enrollment jointly to allow for efficiency gains by accounting for cross-equation error 
correlation (supported by Breusch–Pagan p<0.01 in all instances). Finally, I directly control for 
important concurrent policies in terms of (a) years exposure to a large-scale national education 
program – the District Primary Education Program, or DPEP – that was implemented across 
districts at different times, and (b) the state’s cumulative exposure to progressive-party rule. 
None of the estimates are particularly sensitive to these controls, so for simplicity I refer to those 
estimates that only control for the pre-period enrollment rate as the preferred specifications 
(column 2). I estimate district enrollment rates as of 2007, with the main regressor being the 
cumulative exposure, in years, to the 73rd Amendment provisions as of 2007. 
Table 4 contains the results of the estimation of equation (2) for non-minority group 
women (Panel A) and men (Panel B). Coefficient magnitudes are interpreted as the fractional 
increase in the enrollment rate per additional year of policy exposure. Based on the preferred 
specification (column 2) including only the pre-policy control, an additional year of exposure to 
the policy increases the enrollment rate of non-SC/ST women by .7 percentage points; given that 
pre-policy enrollment rates for this sample was less than 50 percent (Table 3) and mean exposure 
to the policy was 10.3 years, the policy likely played a substantial role in increasing educational 
enrollment of young women. Panel B shows a commensurate effect of the policy among young 
                                                 
11 There are different observation counts across measures due to some cells containing zero values in the 
denominator; in general, these district pairs would be jointly very small in size and thus less important in weighted 
regressions. In the estimations, district pairs missing values in any regressor are implicitly dropped. 
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men in the same social group, corroborating the event study estimates and suggesting the policy 
may have had effects on enrollment beyond just those on women. 
Because quotas for ethnic minorities were set to be proportionate to the local population 
share, it is possible to distinguish the effects of the different spheres of reservation by interacting 
the SC/ST population share with the cumulative years of exposure to the policy. In such a 
specification, the main policy regressor can then be interpreted as the isolated effect of exposure 
to women leaders since a zero SC/ST population share is conceptually possible (although rare), 
while the coefficient on the interaction term controls for the effect of SC/ST quotas. Table 5 
contains these estimates for the SC/ST sample, showing large effects (although less precisely 
estimated) effects among young women (Panel A) and again among men (Panel B). Overall, the 
effects of women leaders are substantial for all groups, and, for women, of a magnitude 
comparable to that found by earlier research in a different context.  
To address the issues of either the necessary loss of some border districts in constructing 
the matched sample and the necessity of choosing matching variables, Figure 4 shows the 
empirical distribution of coefficients across 500 paired-district samples, where in each sample, 
districts with multiple cross-border neighbors were randomly matched among the set of 
adjacencies (and then removed from the pool) to form unique pairs. This approach, in aggregate, 
loses no information contained in border districts, does not rely on a choice of matching 
variables, and confirms that the effect magnitudes and patterns across subsamples in the primary 
estimates are not particularly sensitive to these methodological decisions (except in one case, 
where the magnitude appears moderated but still sizable).12 
The remainder of this section presents analysis shedding light on the activities displaced 
by the increase in enrollment, and heterogeneous effects within the population. Using 
information on the other activities respondents may claim as their principal use of time, I am able 
to investigate which other activities experienced a reduction among school-age children 
subsequent to the policy. After making alternative activities consistent across surveys, there are 
four possible other uses of time that respondents may claim as their principal activity. Three are 
traditional labor force activities (working in a household enterprise, wage work in a non-
                                                 
12 In their work addressing the invalidity of the bootstrap in matching estimators, Abadie and Imbens (2008) point to 
the approach of Politis and Romano (1994), who suggest the construction of confidence regions based on 
subsamples as an valid inferential method.  
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household enterprise, or “looking for work”), while the final category comprises non-wage, non-
labor force domestic duties. Tables 6 and 7 present estimations of the preferred specification in 
the border strategy (including only the pre-policy control) across the different activities and 
samples. Containing estimates for non-SC/ST women and men, Table 6 shows that those of  
higher social groups saw increased enrollment among individuals who would have otherwise 
engaged in household production or been idle; Table 7 shows that this pattern is not the same 
among lower social groups, as shifts towards enrollment come only from those who would have 
been idle or engaged in non-wage household duties despite a larger share of children engaged in 
household-based employment. This suggests that while the reservations policy appeared to have 
a uniformly positive effect across all subsamples, this force may not have been strong enough to 
overcome the immediate opportunity cost of household production for those in lower castes and 
the availability of household labor remains is a persistent barrier to educational enrollment 
among more disadvantaged groups. This suggests that household labor may be a persistent 
barrier to educational enrollment among more disadvantaged groups, at least in terms of 
responsiveness to the focal policy (see Basu and Van (1998) for theoretical discussion). While 
further investigation of these differences is left for future work, patterns across samples in shifts 
in time use linked to policy exposure suggest attention be paid to shifts in time-use alternatives to 
schooling across distinct subsamples of the population. 
I next use the rich cross-sectional nature of the survey data to investigate additional 
parameter heterogeneity. I estimate the preferred specification for samples differentiating 
individuals by age group, by their household’s relative income level and by a proxy for initial 
expectations for educational attainment via the highest education level among adult women in 
the household. Table 8 presents these estimates, showing that for both groups of women, the 
quotas appeared to affect enrollment at the well-known age range of 12 and above for girls 
dropping out of school. There are no clear patterns in differential effects across relative income 
levels, although there is some tendency for a stronger effect among children from poorer 
families. Most importantly, however, is the pattern across young women in the effects when the 
sample is split by the highest education of adult female household members. Across both groups, 
policy effects are concentrated among young women in families that had uneducated (illiterate) 
older women in the household—those young women that had less-educated initial proximate 
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female role models. This suggests a potential causal channel by which leaders may affect 
educational investment as one which particularly operates among those who had lower initial 
expected educational attainment and returns to education. 
V. Robustness 
The main estimates are robust to several alternative approaches. First, coefficient 
estimates and patterns across samples are unchanged when weighting districts by the log of 
population, Winsorizing the dependent variable at either one or five percent, including area 
demographic controls directly, or adopting a differenced specification. Instrumenting for the 
policy exposure differential based on an “expected” differential calculated from the expected 
implementation timing based on election cycles prior to the passage of the 73rd Amendment. 
Mathew (2000) gives state level information on local governance elections prior to the 1993 
reforms used to construct this expected differential.13 While the magnitude of the effect is 
somewhat moderated, the direction and pattern of effects is still consistent with the main 
estimates. Falsification tests based on placebo variation in state implementation timing indicate 
the magnitude and significance of the effects are unlikely to arise by chance, and additional 
robustness checks ensure that the estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion of any particular 
state.14  
A remaining criticism is that the policy measure based on state implementation timing 
necessarily conflates exposure to decentralized local governance with exposure to seat 
reservations for women. While full details of this approach and analysis are available in the Web 
Appendix, Appendix Table 2 uses within-state variation in exposure to district chairperson seat 
reservations15 to estimate the effects of longer exposure to women leaders in the highest seat in 
local government on enrollment rates. This policy measure does not suffer from any conflation 
                                                 
13 While not directly available for every state, I am able to construct the expected implementation year for a majority 
of states based on election cycle lengths and pre-1993 election years; the majority of these expected 
implementations are the same or very close to the actual effective implementation years. For states for which it is 
not possible to construct this information I use the actual effective implementation date. This latter necessary 
adjustment suggests an artificially strong first stage, and possible mechanical violation of the exclusion restriction. 
Thus caution should be taken in the interpretation of the IV estimates, which are provided merely as a robustness 
check rather than as a preferred strategy. 
14 These robustness checks are available from the author upon request. 
15 These data were collected and made available by Iyer et al. (2012). 
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with exposure to decentralization, and across the sample of states for which it is available, I find 
highly comparable effects with estimates given by the border strategy for the same sample—
providing evidence that women leaders do affect enrollment, and that the estimates from the 
border identification strategy reflects these effects.  
Finally, the positive and substantial effects among young men require some discussion, 
particularly in relation to earlier studies which focused on a sample of villages in West Bengal 
and found no effects among young men (Beaman et al. 2012). Beyond a different geographic 
sample, it should first be clear that there are several important differences in the policy variation 
used to estimate effects on enrollment: Beaman et al. (2012) use variation in leadership seats at 
the village level of the panchayat system, while the policy exposure used in the current work 
implicitly captures exposure to reserved seats in the non-leadership body of the panchayats (in 
addition to leaders), at all levels of the structure. Nevertheless, when restricting the border 
analysis to the sample of districts in West Bengal and its neighbors (and pooling groups within 
sexes), I get a highly similar pattern and magnitude of results to those in Beaman et al. (2012) in 
Appendix Table 3. This result suggests a number of factors regarding both interpretation and 
generalizability. It is important to point out that inference is this case is not valid, as there is 
serial correlation in error terms across the districts in West Bengal and thus no degrees of 
freedom when clustering by the policy exposure measure. Nonetheless, the pattern of magnitudes 
is suggestive of a number of factors. First, the effects of women leaders are likely transmitted 
primarily through exposure to local leaders, as the measure incorporating exposure at all levels is 
not any stronger that the village-level exposure measure. Second, that the magnitudes and 
patterns correspond is further evidence that the policy measure used in this study captures the 
effects of women leaders, rather than the decentralization reform. Finally, West Bengal may be 
particular in potentially lacking some of the dynamics among men explored and discussed below.  
VI. Testing causal channels of school infrastructure, the labor market, and 
household bargaining 
Various mechanisms potentially contribute to the circuitous link between political and economic 
empowerment, including infrastructure and public goods provision (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004a, b), labor market effects, women’s bargaining power (Schultz 2001) or aspirations 
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(Beaman et al. 2012). In the following section, I investigate and discuss these hypotheses as 
potential channels by which the effects of a changed local leadership composition on educational 
enrollment may arise. 
School provision 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004a) find that the gender of local leaders affects the public goods 
provided in a community, and that women leaders direct public spending to infrastructure that is 
more relevant to their own gender. Earlier work has shown that male and female leaders have 
different policy preferences; a conceptual extension would suggest differential provision of 
schooling infrastructure if women leaders indeed prefer educational infrastructure more so than 
male leaders. To investigate whether educational infrastructure provision was caused by longer 
exposure to the 73rd Amendment reforms, I use data from India’s “District Report Cards” 
provided by the District Information System for Education (DISE). Since 2000-01, this agency 
has annually compiled district-level data on over 400 education-related indicators. For the 
purpose of parsimony, I constructed a small set of variables from the DISE data that allow me to 
test hypotheses regarding the extensive and intensive margins of schooling infrastructure, 
including schools per thousand persons, new schools established per thousand persons since 
1995, teachers per pupil and the share of classrooms in good condition. I also capture a set of 
measures related to the experience of girls in schools, particularly the share of schools that have 
a separate girls’ lavatory and the share of teachers who are female. Using the 2007-08 DISE data 
corresponding to the enrollment figures analyzed above, Table 9 shows the results of estimating 
equation (1) using these schooling indicators as the outcome. Each column in Table 9 shows the 
coefficient on the difference in exposure using the dependent variable indicated. For the 
extensive margin, the preferred measure (rural schools per thousand rural population) does not 
appear to be correlated to a longer exposure gap.16 While there is some evidence that teacher-to-
pupil ratios were commensurate with the enrollment increases induced by the policy (by nature 
of a non-negative estimated effect), this is estimated imprecisely and the hiring of teachers may 
mechanically follow from increased enrollment, rather than precede it. Finally, among gender-
related factors, there is no relationship between female-friendly facilities or higher female share 
                                                 
16 Results of this analysis are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of the 1987 enrollment difference as a control. 
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of teachers and longer policy exposure. Overall, minimal evidence, if any, of an increase in 
educational infrastructure associated with longer exposure to the reform.17 
Labor market effects and contemporaneous returns to education 
Labor market dynamics making women’s work more valuable may affect educational decisions 
of young women in two ways: via increased incomes of adult women changing relative intra-
household bargaining power, and by increasing the returns to education for women. A long 
literature has looked at gender-differentiated effects of household income as well as the role of 
female earnings and bargaining power on educational attainment.18 Table 10 investigates a range 
of labor market, marriage and household bargaining power-type indicators (available from the 
NSS data) in the same border framework to determine whether these factors appear related to 
longer exposure to the quota policy. These include measures of women’s labor force 
participation, probability of marriage, and, conditional on being married, number of children, age 
at first birth, husband’s education, the product of husband’s and wife’s education, and husband’s 
wage. This analysis purposively uses the sample of rural women from an older cohort (25-35 
years old) whose educational decisions were complete or near-complete by the time of the 73rd 
Amendment and its implementation, allowing me to investigate effects absent changes in 
educational attainment brought about by the policy. Congruent with earlier studies, there is little 
evidence of changed labor market, marriage or household dynamics associated with longer 
exposure to the quota policy.19,20 
                                                 
17 These results appear to contrast with those of Clots-Figueras (2012). In particular, Clots-Figueras (2012) found 
that women leaders increased educational enrollment in urban but not rural areas, and among both boys and girls, 
and this effect occurred through greater provision of schooling infrastructure.  In my paper, I find effects for girls 
only, and rule out schooling provision as a mechanism for this to occur. It may not be reasonable, however, to 
compare the two studies directly: Clots-Figueras (2012) studies a substantially earlier time period in India when 
enrollment rates were substantially lower and the electoral context was absent any seat quota system. For this 
reason, incentives regarding the provision of public goods, as well as constituents’ perception of women leaders, are 
likely to be different in the two contexts. 
18 Among others, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) use a panel dataset of Vietnamese households to show that 
exogenous changes in household income though rice prices cause a reduction in child labor, and these reductions are 
largest for girls of secondary-school age and correspond to a commensurate increase in school attendance for the 
group; for female bargaining power, de Carvalho Filho (2008) finds a pronounced effect of social security benefits 
on female child labor when benefits go to female household members. 
19 Two recent studies provide some evidence that seat quotas in India affected labor market opportunities for adult 
women. Ghani et al. (2014) find short-run effects of political reservations caused an increase in women-owned 
establishments created in the unorganized manufacturing sector, particularly in traditional and household-based 
industries, relative to new male-owned establishments. In the public sector, longer cumulative exposure to women 
leaders increased the share of government-provided employment given to women at the introduction of a national 
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VII. Channels for women leaders to communicate changing roles 
With minimal evidence pointing to explicit cost or return factors as the channel by which seat 
quotas affected enrollment, this section details additional descriptive evidence that suggests the 
introduction of women leaders to government may communicate a changing social environment 
to which individuals’ respond in setting their goals for social and economic outcomes.  
News media as a perpetual, broad-based salience channel 
From an optimistic standpoint, the news media can serve as an objective fact-reporting 
mechanism reflecting an increasing presence of women in public life with a potentially lower 
propensity to express existing social norms than other media. To test whether the media plays a 
role in the salience of (women) leaders, I analyze the web archive of news media articles 
available on the Times of India from 2001 to 2007.21 Using this single, leading national English-
language daily will likely indicate coverage patterns across similar media given high 
correspondence of news reporting across outlets, and may be less likely to report on local rural 
governance than smaller news outlets—thus providing a lower bound to the responsiveness of 
news coverage of local politicians. 
The archive in total contains 560,552 valid links to articles. Once downloaded, articles 
are inspected for geographical references in the initial lines of text based on a list of 1,200 of 
India’s largest cities. Of these, 378,439 articles reference a specific geographic location. The 
articles are then assigned a reference state based on city information, and information regarding 
the timing of elections is matched into the data. I remove from the sample articles identifiable as 
coming from sports, business, fashion/style, or international sections of the paper, leaving over 
                                                                                                                                                             
rural employment guarantee scheme over the period of 2005-2008 (Ghani et al. 2013). The share of women 
participating in either of these specific labor force activities is relatively small, however, and unlikely to appear as 
large changes when considering the labor force participation or activities of all women. 
20 Beyond bargaining power, expanded labor force activities available to women may change incentives for parents 
to invest in daughters. A substantial literature investigates the role of demand-side factors changing the underlying 
valuation of education for girls in LDCs. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that the expansion of the financial 
sector and other white collar industries caused enrollment in English language schools to increase for girls (but not 
boys). Similarly, Oster and Millet (2010) show that the introduction of a call center in towns in southern India 
generated large increases in school enrolment for both boys and girls. Shastry (2010) finds that the information 
technology sector grew more rapidly in areas of India where English is more widely spoken, and that in turn those 
areas experienced increased school enrolment. Kochar (2004) showed that urban rates of return influence rural 
schooling, particularly amongst households who are most likely to seek urban employment.  
21Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/archive.cms, accessed May-September 2014. 
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345,000 articles. Dropping articles about areas not part of the panchayat system (largely Delhi), 
244,462 articles remain. 
I inspect the text of articles for strings indicating words referring to three concepts: 
panchayats or leaders (“panchayat”, “sarpanch”, “mukhiya”, or “pradhan”), school or education 
(“educat-“, “school”, “class”, “teach-”,  “college”, or “university”) and women or girls 
(“women”, “woman”, “female”, or “girl”).  While rudimentary, this approach nonetheless should 
capture the bulk of articles referring to any of these concepts, with perhaps the exception of the 
latter group being overly general and likely more noisy by construction.22 I use the textual 
information to construct three separate indicators for articles containing panchayat, education, or 
“women” words. I then use a difference-in-differences identification strategy to assess the 
change in the incidence of articles containing references to these concepts in state elections years 
versus non-election years to associated election years with differential coverage of these topics 
relative to non-election years. The estimating equation is: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 (4)  
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is an indicator for article i, referencing state s in year t, 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠,𝑡 an indicator for 
there being panchayat elections in state s and year t, and 𝜃 and 𝛾 the vectors of coefficients on 
state and year indicators, respectively. 𝜀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 is the disturbance term, potentially correlated within 
states. I estimate this specification with a linear probability model for the six outcome indicators 
in 𝑌𝑖,𝑠,𝑡: separately for articles referencing the three topic groups above, as well as articles 
referencing three combinations of the topics (women and panchayats, school and panchayats, and 
women and education).23 
Table 11 contains the estimated coefficients for 𝛿1 for the theme indicators, scaled in 
magnitude to be read as “per thousand articles”. Within state and controlling for national yearly 
shocks, Column 1 shows an increase of 10 out of every 1,000 articles that reference panchayats 
in elections years versus non-election years; this is not particularly surprising: media coverage of 
the governance system goes up in election years. Column 2 shows that the share of articles 
                                                 
22 No other words, stems or combinations have been tested to identify alternative sets of article groups referencing 
these concepts. 
23 It is important to note that this analysis does not attempt to distinguish whether news media changes in response to 
the presence of women leaders, or demand from readers for articles on certain topics, or if news media definitively 
drives educational outcomes; rather the analysis looks for evidence of this channel as one allowing women leaders to 
be salient to the general public.  
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referencing schools also increases in election years by nearly the same magnitude, while column 
3 shows no discernible increase in articles containing the set of words used to capture references 
to women (admittedly an imprecise measure). Column 4 looks at the increase in the share of 
articles that reference both the panchayat system and women: nearly one-fifth of the increase in 
the share of articles referencing panchayats is comprised of articles also referencing women, and 
there is a smaller and marginally significant increase in the share of articles referencing both 
panchayats and schools. There is no increase in articles referencing both women and schools, 
although this may be due to the noise in the former measure. 
The magnitudes seem small until the volume of new articles analyzed is considered. 
Given nearly 250,000 articles over the sample period, this translates to nearly 100 articles per 
day. Given the magnitudes above, this implies an additional article referencing panchayats per 
day in election years, and an additional article approximately weekly referencing panchayats and 
women, and panchayats and schools, in election years.  
To some degree, making leaders salient of an obvious and natural role of the media—the 
above analysis provides corroborative empirical evidence of this being the case, rather than a 
rigorous test of the transmission of role-model effects. Given that the framework used earlier is 
one that considers cumulative effects of women leaders, more instances of increased salience 
over time (as estimated by the difference-in-difference estimator as “each election year”) can be 
seen as a mechanism affecting preferences over time. A more rigorous test of the transmission of 
the role model effects lefts for future work would necessarily also assess the consumption of 
media to understand for whom the aspirations are operating (parents, children, or both) and to 
investigate a range of specific media. Nonetheless, the above analysis suggests popular media, by 
making women leaders and issues of education more salient, may play a role in affecting the 
aspirations of, and/or for, younger constituents.24 
Competition in unreserved parliamentary elections: educational attainment of candidates 
Table 12 shows the educational composition of candidates and winners in the 2009 
parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections by sex. (It is important to note here that there are no quotas 
                                                 
24 The Times of India is known to be slightly “center-left” in its reporting. This may skew the results upward if such 
leaning increases the responsiveness to reporting on local governance and/or coverage of gender issues. However, 
likely dominating such an effect is that the Times of India is a national English-language daily, which may be less 
likely to report on local elections and issues relative to regional or local newspapers—thus likely understating the 
media’s role in making leaders salient to constituents at the local level. 
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for women in parliamentary elections.) Overall, there is no distinct difference in the distribution 
of educational attainment of candidates or election winners by sex, suggesting that women 
candidates are selected without overcompensating for sex bias with educational attainment 
beyond that of male candidates. At the same time, the equivalence in the distribution of 
educational attainment among candidates does not reflect persistent gender differences in 
educational attainment in the population; thus the difference in the average female candidate’s 
education relative to that of the average female constituent is likely greater than the difference 
between the average male candidate’s education relative to the average male constituent—
suggesting educational attainment as one potential margin which allows women to achieve social 
status equivalent to that of men.  
Competition in unreserved parliamentary elections: sex composition of candidates 
Using variation in cumulative years of district leadership seats reserved for women 
provided by Iyer et al. (2012), Table 13 shows the effect of an additional year of reservations for 
women on various measures of electoral competition in the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
Column 1 shows that each additional year of exposure to the district chairperson seat being 
reserved for woman results in an increase of more than four percentage points in the probability 
that the constituency will have at least one female candidate running for an (unreserved) 
parliamentary seat. However, there is not a strong effect among women candidates winning the 
election (column 3), nor in the vote share garnered by women candidates. 
Overall, there is a plausible channel for women leaders to be salient to constituents, 
women politicians provide information on the pedigree required to compete with men in the 
social/political sphere, and the quota system in local government is linked to expressions of 
higher aspirations of women (politicians) who become more likely to contest unreserved 
parliamentary elections. While not exhaustive, these investigations lend further support for the 
potential of a role-model effect of leaders in changing the aspirations of female constituents. 
Explaining effects among men 
The estimated effects among men are potentially explained through either of two 
dynamic channels, both in response to the changing educational attainment of young women. 
The first, and simplest, is that the signaling value of any given level of education becomes lower 
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and/or less precise when more individuals attain a given level of education—suggesting a 
dynamic effect initially of young men in response to young women’s increased enrollment (and 
continued dynamic effects from there). Such inflows at a given point in the distribution of 
educational attainment are likely to also have “racheting” effects through higher levels of 
investment as modeled by Lang & Kropp (1986) and Bedard (2001). 
An alternative explanation involves prospective adjustments in human capital investment 
aimed at marriage market matching. Positive assortative matching on educational attainment in 
the marriage market is extremely high and persistent in India, as is a persistent differential in 
educational attainment within couples. In Figure 5, I use India’s DHS data from 2005-2006 to 
show this persistence relative to the strong secular trend in women’s education. This analysis 
makes an additional point as well: there is a substantial increase in average women’s education 
visible across the in the birth cohorts from 1980 to 1990 – those cohorts who were largely 
overlapping with the policy implementation around middle- and secondary school ages – despite 
the average marriage differential for those cohorts of women effectively remaining flat. Thus, it 
is clear that these women married proportionately higher-educated men. While this analysis is 
only descriptive and further work is needed to explore these dynamics, these trends nonetheless 
suggest that marriage differentials are persistent, are not closing as fast as the secular trend, and 
cohorts that experienced a substantial increase in educational attainment married proportionately 
higher-educated men. 
VIII. Conclusion 
This paper assesses the relationship between political inclusion and human capital investment of 
young constituents, finding that India’s flagship political empowerment policy mandating 
representation quotas for women in local government increased post-primary school enrollment 
rates of both girls and boys. The empirical strategy undertaken provides a method for assessing 
the long-term impacts of mandated seat quotas in a general context and using administrative 
data, as it takes advantage of a design naturally arising from constraints likely to be faced when 
similar policies are enacted and result in staggered implementation due to asynchronous election 
timings across jurisdictions.  
25 
 
I examine a battery of potential mechanisms that could allow women leaders to affect the 
educational decisions of young constituents, with no evidence of effects among schooling 
infrastructure, the labor market, or marriage/household dynamics. What remains are margins 
related to factors not directly observable with large-scale surveys: perceived returns to education 
and/or aspirations, whereby women leaders increase educational investment of girls via a “role 
model” effect. Increased educational aspirations are not observationally distinct from increases in 
perceived returns to education among young women, which I do not rule out as potentially 
overlapping mechanisms (in both definition and consequence) that can be actuated by role 
models.25 I provide novel empirical evidence of ways in which leaders serve as role models and 
indicators of a changing social fabric, affecting the expectations and aspirations of young female 
constituents. Effects among young men may not be trivial, and are most easily explained as 
dynamic responses to the enrollment effects among young women. 
That the estimated effects are comparable to earlier work exploiting truly randomized 
exposure to seat quotas lends credence to the approach, and the increase in scope allows for new 
consideration of the possible dynamic response of men to an affirmative action policy targeted at 
women. These results can further guide policymakers as to whether seat quotas may be a viable 
option to reduce gender or social inequality across dimensions that are historically difficult to 
affect directly via typical policy levers, and may better inform the degree to which such a policy 
can be expected to have gender-specific, or even broader, effects.   
                                                 
25 For evidence that children’s educational expectations and aspirations are highly covariant (with a partial 
correlation of .5), see Bernard et al (2014). 
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Table 1
Mean enrollment rates in rural areas
by social group, gender, age and year
non-SC/ST SC/ST
Age 1987 1993 1999 2004 2007 Change 1987 1993 1999 2004 2007 Change
Panel A: Male
5 -- 8 .98 .99 .99 1.00 .99 .01 .96 .98 .99 .99 .99 .03
9 -- 11 .91 .94 .97 .99 .98 .07 .83 .89 .94 .98 .97 .14
12 -- 14 .78 .85 .88 .91 .93 .15 .65 .73 .79 .87 .88 .23
15 -- 17 .50 .55 .61 .63 .69 .19 .39 .41 .48 .51 .55 .17
Panel B: Female
5 -- 8 .96 .98 .99 1.00 .99 .03 .94 .94 .98 .99 .97 .03
9 -- 11 .77 .84 .93 .96 .96 .19 .60 .73 .86 .93 .93 .33
12 -- 14 .50 .62 .73 .79 .83 .33 .32 .43 .60 .71 .78 .46
15 -- 17 .22 .31 .42 .48 .55 .33 .12 .19 .30 .37 .45 .33
Panel C: Female - Male enrollment gap
5 -- 8 -.02 -.02 .00 .00 .00 .02 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01 -.02 .01
9 -- 11 -.14 -.11 -.05 -.03 -.02 .12 -.23 -.16 -.09 -.05 -.04 .19
12 -- 14 -.28 -.23 -.15 -.12 -.10 .18 -.33 -.30 -.19 -.16 -.10 .23
15 -- 17 -.29 -.24 -.19 -.15 -.14 .15 -.27 -.22 -.19 -.14 -.10 .16
Notes: Author's calculations using National Sample Survey data (various rounds). Enrollment rates are calculated as the mean across individuals of an indicator 
for usual principal activity reported as "attending an educational institution" for the age groups specified. Population estimates are constructed by weighting by 
the inverse sampling probability (sample weights) provided with the data.
Table 2
Testing for differential trends in pre-policy enrollment rates
Dependent variable: individual enrollment [0/1]
Sample: women men
non-SC/ST SC/ST non-SC/ST SC/ST
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 0.018 0.020 0.011 0.010
(0.00213) (0.00254) (0.00174) (0.00202)
Year*73rd CAA implementation year 0.00071 0.00009 0.00016 0.00107
(0.00053) (0.00066) (0.00028) (0.00044)
N 65,961 22,531 78,718 27,805
adj. R 2 0.289 0.306 0.186 0.202
Table 3
Summary statistics, cross-border estimation sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Enrollment rate - 2007
non-SC/ST, female 0.80 0.13 0.41 1.00 178
non-SC/ST, male 0.89 0.09 0.56 1.00 178
SC/ST, female 0.74 0.21 0.05 1.00 177
SC/ST, male 0.80 0.14 0.29 1.00 177
Enrollment rate  - 1987
non-SC/ST, female 0.45 0.20 0.00 0.96 174
non-SC/ST, male 0.72 0.15 0.00 1.00 174
SC/ST, female 0.29 0.22 0.00 1.00 172
SC/ST, male 0.61 0.21 0.00 1.00 173
Years Exposure to 73rd Amendment, 2007 10.7 2.7 2.0 14.0 178
Combined population of district pair, 1987 267,213 177,386 5,652 1,013,896 174
Notes: Table presents a test of differential pre-period trends estimated via a linear probability model regressing individual-level enrollment 
status of 9 to 17 year-olds in rural areas across three pre-intervention survey waves on a linear time trend and the time trend interacted with 
the state-level policy implementation year. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All 
specifications include an unreported constant term and vectors of state fixed effects. Estimations are weighted by the provided sampling 
weight. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Notes: Table shows summary statistics for districts lying on state borders. District-level enrollment rates calculated as the count of individuals reporting 
usual principal activity as "attending an educational institution" divided by the total population for the sample of 9 to 17 year-olds in rural areas using 
sample weights.
Table 4
Estimation of school enrollment rates
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Specification: Base Incl. 1987 
control
SUR Incl. policy 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.007+ 0.007+ 0.007+++ 0.008++
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean outcome 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126
Pre-policy control N Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178
adj. R 2 0.406 0.416 0.416 0.429
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.006++ 0.006+ 0.006+++ 0.006++
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean outcome 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.889
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089
Pre-policy control N Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178
adj. R 2 0.350 0.356 0.356 0.352
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 
cumulative policy exposure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised 
of 9-17 year-olds in rural areas. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
robust standard errors two-way clustered by state and district reported in parentheses. All specifications include an 
unreported constant term and district pair fixed effects. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 5
Estimation of school enrollment rates
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Specification: Base Incl. 1987 
control
SUR Incl. policy 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.048+++ 0.045+++ 0.045+++ 0.046+++
(0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Mean outcome 0.737 0.737 0.737 0.737
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.211 0.211 0.211 0.211
Pre-policy control N Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178
adj. R 2 0.350 0.351 0.351 0.334
Panel B: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.025++ 0.025++ 0.025+++ 0.025++
(0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Mean outcome 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143
Pre-policy control N Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178
adj. R 2 0.315 0.307 0.307 0.363
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 
cumulative policy exposure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised 
of 9-17 year-olds in rural areas. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
robust standard errors two-way clustered by state and district reported in parentheses. All specifications include an 
unreported constant term and district pair fixed effects. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 6
Cumulative effect of reservation on alternative time use outcomes
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district mean share of 9-17 year-olds engaged in activity
Outcome: In labor force LF: Work in hh 
enterprise
LF: Work in 
formal sector
LF: Looking for 
work
Household 
duties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.0027 -0.0032+ 0.0006+ -0.0014+ -0.0046
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0033)
Mean outcome 0.051 0.046 0.002 0.016 0.146
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.073 0.070 0.012 0.035 0.119
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178 178
adj. R 2 0.400 0.417 0.140 0.065 0.409
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.0063+++ -0.0050++ -0.0006++ -0.0008 0.0003
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0005)
Mean outcome 0.102 0.084 0.007 0.026 0.009
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.085 0.080 0.017 0.040 0.022
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y Y
N 178 178 178 178 178
adj. R2 0.265 0.359 0.117 0 0.469
Table 7
Cumulative effect of reservation on alternative time use outcomes
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district mean share of 9-17 year-olds engaged in activity
Outcome: In labor force LF: Work in hh 
enterprise
LF: Work in 
formal sector
LF: Looking for 
work
Household 
duties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.0041 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0379+++
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0077)
Mean outcome 0.073 0.070 0.002 0.020 0.190
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.101 0.100 0.016 0.045 0.183
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y Y
N 177 177 177 177 177
adj. R2 0.237 0.230 0.169 0.151 0.244
Panel B: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.0156++ -0.0060 -0.0031 -0.0114++ -0.0112+++
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0022) (0.0046) (0.0022)
Mean outcome 0.172 0.144 0.010 0.047 0.027
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.132 0.132 0.037 0.062 0.064
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y Y
N 177 177 177 177 177
adj. R 2 0.213 0.226 -0.232 0.005 0.471
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure 
measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised of 25-35 year-old women in rural areas. All 
measures calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All 
specifications include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance 
indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure 
measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised of 25-35 year-old women in rural areas. All 
measures calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All 
specifications include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance 
indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 8
Parameter heterogeneity in enrollment effects
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district enrollment rate
Age Income tercile Highest F. educ. Level
Sample group: 9 to 11 12 to 14 15 to 17 1st 2nd 3rd Illiteracy Literacy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.002 0.010 0.003 0.013++ 0.016 0.009 0.007++ -0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
adj. R 2 0.173 0.329 0.350 0.377 0.119 0.225 0.259 0.035
N 177 176 174 150 170 173 174 172
Panel B: non-SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.001 -0.004 0.018+++ 0.007+ 0.008 -0.002 0.005 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
adj. R 2 0.101 0.240 0.325 0.095 0.072 0.050 0.212 0.120
N 177 176 174 150 170 173 174 172
Panel C: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.021 0.037++ 0.101+++ 0.058++ 0.019 0.074 0.042+++ -0.028
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.032) (0.046) (0.011) (0.024)
adj. R 2 0.027 0.314 0.389 0.096 0.077 0.159 0.310 0.417
N 174 167 167 141 157 142 173 133
Panel D: SC/ST men
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.007++ 0.031++ 0.027 0.018 0.007 0.138+++ 0.019+ 0.043
(0.003) (0.014) (0.030) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.011) (0.034)
adj. R 2 0.151 0.172 0.170 0.104 0.058 0.408 0.307 0.022
N 174 171 167 142 164 159 173 137
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. 
Underlying sample indicacted by panel and column titles. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in 
parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 9
Differences in schooling infrastructure and schooling environment
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: district schooling infrastructure indicator
Schools per total 
population
Schools per 
population 
(rural)
New schools 
established per 
000 population
Share of 
classrooms in 
"good" 
condition
Teachers per 
pupil
Share of schools 
with girls' 
lavatory
Share teachers 
female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exposure, 2007 (years) -0.00001 -0.00003 -0.00001 0.00728 0.01960 -0.00017 -0.00756
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00806) (0.01539) (0.00031) (0.00734)
N 176 176 176 177 177 177 177
adj. R 2 0.435 0.500 0.347 0.512 0.404 0.480 0.588
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district schooling infrastructure measure (indicated by column) in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure 
measure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include 
an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control measure. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 10
Cumulative effect of reservation on alternative outcomes
cross-state border district variation
Dependent variable: standardized district indicator mean
Outcome: Labor force 
participation
share married number of children 
| married=1
age at first 
birth | 
married=1
husband's 
education 
(years) | married 
= 1
husb. ed*own 
ed. | married = 1
husband's 
wage | married 
= 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.024 -0.045 0.015 -0.114++ 0.033 0.004 0.002
(0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.041) (0.045) (0.039) (0.030)
N 178 163 163 163 163 163 162
adj. R 2 0.352 0.038 0.084 -0.058 0.289 0.378 0.217
Panel B: SC/ST women
Exposure, 2007 (years) 0.004 -0.056 0.010 -0.116+++ -0.064 -0.051 0.030++
(0.045) (0.055) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.059) (0.011)
N 177 174 174 173 174 174 173
adj. R 2 0.118 0.147 0.331 -0.199 0.351 0.168 0.421
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the district enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 policy exposure measure among neighboring districts lying 
across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised of 25-35 year-old women in rural areas. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust 
standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. All specifications include an unreported constant term, district pair fixed effects, and a district-level pre-policy control 
measure. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Table 11
Salience of leaders via news media:
Difference-in-differences estimates using the Times of India web archive (2001-2007)
Dependent variable: indicator for at least one word in topic set(s) found in article text
Panchayats/ 
leaders
School/ 
education
Women/ girls Women/girls 
and Panchayats/ 
leaders
School/ 
education and 
Panchayats/ 
leaders
Women/ girls 
and school/ 
education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election year indicator 10.33+++ 9.708+++ -2.297 1.711++ 1.033+ -0.630
(2.960) (4.197) (4.071) (0.861) (0.635) (2.728)
N 244,462 244,462 244,462 244,462 244,462 244,462
adj. R 2 0.009 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear probability model regressing an indicator for appearance of word related to the topics in column headers 
on an indicator for the state and year the article references holding Panchayat elections. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state 
reported in parentheses. All specifications include separate vectors of state and year fixed effects and an unreported constant term. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, 
Table 12
Education of Lok Sabha Candidates and Members, 2009 elections
Candidates Winners
Education level Women Men Women Men
Illiterate 4% 3% 0% 1%
Some School 27% 27% 7% 12%
Undergraduate 10% 10% 18% 8%
Graduate 37% 40% 67% 73%
Unknown 22% 20% 9% 6%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author's calculations based on data from empoweringindia.org. Chi-square tests fail to reject distributional 
equality across either the candidate (X 2 =4.53, p >.30) or the winner (X 2 =6.69, p >.15) samples.
Table 13
Cumulative effect of district leadership on contesting Lok Sabha elections
within-state constituency variation
Outcome: Any female 
candidate
Share of candidates 
female
Whether female 
candidate won
Vote share to female 
candidates
Voter turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Culumative chairperson reservations 0.042+ 0.005 0.009 0.559 0.083
as of 2007 (years) (0.022) (0.004) (0.016) (0.824) (0.242)
Mean outcome 0.603 0.069 0.121 9.339 58.982
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.491 0.079 0.327 18.145 13.340
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y
N 141 141 141 141 141
adj. R 2 0.038 -0.003 0.059 0.033 0.807
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted, cross-sectional linear regression of 2009 measures of parliamentary election competition indicated 
in column headers on cumulative years of reservation for women in district chairperson seats in 2007. All specifications include an unreported constant 
term and state fixed effects. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
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Note: Map of Maharashtra-Andhra Pradesh border at district Adilabad. Map depicts example of 
multiple district neighbor pairs. 
 
Appendix Table 1
Comparison of state border and interior district enrollment rates
Interior State border
Border - 
Interior p-value N
Panel A: 1987
non-SC/ST, female 0.468 0.477 0.009 0.71 374
non-SC/ST, male 0.737 0.722 -0.015 0.37 374
SC/ST, female 0.335 0.333 -0.002 0.95 368
SC/ST, male 0.647 0.625 -0.022 0.36 368
Female population share 0.445 0.438 -0.007 0.30 374
SC/ST population share 0.220 0.319 0.099+++ 0.00 374
Panel B: 2007
non-SC/ST, female 0.787 0.815 0.028+ 0.06 384
non-SC/ST, male 0.876 0.882 0.006 0.63 384
SC/ST, female 0.768 0.760 -0.008 0.71 376
SC/ST, male 0.813 0.824 0.011 0.50 376
Female population share 0.466 0.465 -0.000 0.95 384
SC/ST population share 0.272 0.370 0.099+++ 0.00 384
En
ro
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Notes: Table shows test of observable differences across border and interior districts in 1987 and 2007. 
Statistical significance tested using two-sample t -tests assuming equal variances.  Significance levels are 
indicated by + <.10, ++ <.05, +++ <.01.
Appendix Table 2
Decentralization versus quotas: using chairperson reservations to estimate 
enrollment rates
within state, cross-district variation
Dependent variable: Enrollment rate
Sample: non-SC/ST SC/ST
women men women men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Border estimates via cumulative 
exposure
Exposure to chairperson 0.009 0.005 0.012++ 0.007+
reservations (years) (0.009) (0.005) (0.056) (0.003)
Mean outcome 0.794 0.886 0.707 0.791
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.122 0.093 0.214 0.131
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y
District-pair fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 100 100 100 100
adj. R 2 0.230 0.327 0.210 0.208
Within-state chairperson reservations
Exposure to chairperson 0.000 -0.004 0.017+++ 0.008+
reservations (years) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Mean outcome 0.771 0.862 0.702 0.788
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.420 0.345 0.457 0.409
Pre-policy control Y Y Y Y
State fixed effects Y Y Y Y
N 10170 11399 4275 4994
adj. R 2 0.037 0.021 0.030 0.007Notes: Coefficients estimated in top panel with the same specification as in column (3) of tables 4 and 5; bottom panel 
estimates from a linear probability model of individual-level enrollment status indicator regressed on the years of 
chairperson reservations as of 2007. Panels contain coefficients from separate regressions estimated for the subsample 
indicated in the column header. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors clustered by state (top panel) or district 
(bottom panel) reported in parentheses. Sample is comprised of individuals 9-17 years old in rural areas. All specifications 
contain an unreported constant term.  Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
Appendix Table 3
Comparison of border effects with village leader effects in West Bengal
Border effects Beaman et al. (2012) village effects
Specification: Women Men Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: non-SC/ST women
Decades exposure 0.142+++ 0.011 0.098++ 0.005
(0.036) (0.047) (0.049) (0.044)
Mean outcome 0.748 0.792 - -
Std. Dev. Outcome 0.125 0.099 - -
Pre-policy control Y Y - -
N 34 34 3680 3680
adj. R 2 0.808 0.477 - -
Notes: Table presents coefficients from an unweighted linear regression of the enrollment rate in 2007 on the 2007 
cumulative policy exposure among neighboring districts lying across state borders. Underlying sample is comprised 
of 9-17 year-olds in rural areas. Enrollment rates are calculated using sample weights. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
robust standard errors two-way clustered by state and district reported in parentheses. All specifications include an 
unreported constant term and district pair fixed effects. Significance indicated by: + p<.1, ++ p<.05, +++ p<.01.
